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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether Judge Allphin was required to recuse 
himself sua sponte after indicating that Dr. 
Malovich had testified in his court previously 
and stating that she was "a prominent and very 
credible expert ." 
2. Vvhether the trial court was within its discretion 
in awarding the parties joint legal custody of the 
minor children, with Mother having final deci-
sion-making power, in awarding the parties joint 
physical custody with Mother's home being des-
ignated as the primary residence of the minor 
children, and in awarding Mother 230 nights of 
parent time while awarding Father 135 nights. 
3. Whether Mother is entitled to an award of attor-
ney fees under Rule 24(k) for Father's failure to 
follow the briefing requirements. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
As this appeal is from a district court judgment in a domestic rela-
tions case, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-
4-103(2)(h). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue One: Whether Judge Allphin was required to recuse himself 
sua sponte after indicating that Dr. Malovich had testified in his court 
previously and stating that she was "a prominent and very credible ex-
pert." 
Standard of Review. For the reasons explained in Part I.A of this brief, 1 
this issue is unreviewable. 
Issue Two: Whether the trial court was within its discretion in 
awarding the parties joint legal custody of the minor children, with 
Mother having final decision-making power, in awarding the parties joint 
physical custody with Mother's home being designated as the primary 
residence of the minor children, and in awarding Mother 230 nights of 
parent time while awarding Father 135 nights. 
Standard of Review. In making child custody awards, the trial court is 
given broad discretion and its decisions will not be overturned absent an 
1. See infra at 20-22. 
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abuse of discretion or manifest injustice. 2 If the trial court bases its deci-
sion on the legal standards set by the appellate courts and sets forth ap-
propriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court's findings 
of fact, including its ultimate finding that a custody arrangement is in the 
best interests of the children, is reviewed for clear error. 3 
Issue Three: Whether Mother is entitled to an award of attorney 
fees under Rule 24(k) for Father's failure to follow the briefing require-
ments. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There is no statutory provision whose interpretation is central to 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Jared William Fullmer ("Father") and Appellee Kelli Ann 
Fullmer ("Mother") were married in July of 2003. 4 Two children were born 
in the course of the marriage: R.D.F. ("Son"), who was born in December 
of 2003; and J .A.F. ("Daughter"), who was born in November of 2005. 5 Fa-
2. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah App. 1989); see Tucher 
v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 1214 (Utah 1996) ("Only where the trial court's 
judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion will an ap-
pellate court interpose its own judgment."). 
3. See infra Part II, at 28-30. 
4. R. at 3. 
5. R. at 5. 
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ther filed a petition for divorce on September 30, 2010. 6 Mother filed a 
counterpetition for divorce on October 8, 2010 .7 
On October 25, 2010, per Commissioner Catherine Conklin's rec-
ommendation, the trial court entered temporary orders awarding Father 
temporary possession of the marital apartment and designating him as 
the primary custodial parent. Mother was awarded liberal parent time 
consisting of two of every three weekends from Friday, after school, to 
Monday, prior to school, along with midweek overnights and shared holi-
days.8 
In February of 2011, upon the stipulation of the parties, 9 the trial 
court ordered Dr . Natalie Malovich to conduct a custody evaluation. 10 Dr. 
Malovich completed her evaluation in July of 2011, and a Custody 
Evaluation Settlement Conference was held on August 30, 2011.11 At the 
conference, Dr. Malovich recommended joint legal and physical custody, 
with Mother as the primary custodial parent.12 She further recommended 
that, during the school year, Father should be awarded liberal parent 
time consisting of every other weekend from Friday, after school, to Mon-
6. R. at 3. 
7. R. at 27. 
8. R. at 126-28. 
9. R. at 111-14. 
10. R. at 120-22. 
11. R. at 178. 
12. R. at 336-37 . 
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day, prior to school, along with midweek overnights on Thursdays the 
week after Father's weekend and on Mondays the week before Father's 
weekend. 13 She recommended the parties share holidays per the statute, 
and that Father be awarded "a number of' non-holiday days off school. 14 
The parties should each be awarded an equal amount of the summer 
break. 15 Father rejected this recommendation, and the parties failed to 
reach an agreement on custody and parent time at the settlement confer-
ence.16 The parties therefore began to prepare for trial. 17 
A bench trial on the issues of custody of the children, the children's 
primary residence, parent time, and child support was held on September 
19-21, 2012 before Judge Michael G. Allphin. 18 After the trial was con-
cluded, Judge Allphin made oral findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
final orders on the record on September 25 , 2012, 19 which were later me-
morialized in the district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law20 and Decree of Divorce, 21 both entered on December 20, 2012. In the 
13. R. at 337. 
14. R. at 337. 
15. R. at 338. 
16. R. at 187. 
17. R. at 198, 222-27. 
18. R. at 870-872. For ease of reference, the trial transcripts of Septem-
ber 19th (R. at 870), September 20th (R. at 871), and September 21st (R. at 
872) will be referred to as Tr .I , Tr.2, and Tr.3, respectively. 
19. R. at 868 (hereinafter "Ruling"). 
20. R. at 780. 
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Decree, the court ordered joint legal and physical custody, with Mother as 
the primary custodial parent. Father was awarded liberal parent time 
consisting of every other weekend from Friday, after school, to Monday, 
prior to school, along with midweek overnights on Wednesdays during the 
school year, with the parties sharing holidays per the statute and split-
ting days off school equally. The parties were awarded an equal amount of 
the summer break. 22 
Father filed a Notice of Appeal on January 17, 2013.23 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
I. JUDGE'S REMARKS ALLEGEDLY CONSTITUTING BIAS 
Before trial, Father filed a motion in limine to exclude Dr. 
Malovich's report and to prevent her from testifying at trial, or in the al-
ternative, to prevent her from testifying as to her concerns about Father's 
use of prescription pain medication.24, As grounds for this motion, Father 
argued, inter alia, that because there had never been a finding that he 
had "ever had substance abuse issues, ... further investigation or opinion 
21. R. at 811. 
22. R. at 814-19. 
23. R. at 830. While Father later filed an Amended Notice of Appeal out-
side of the deadline for filing an appeal, R. at 835, its only purpose was to 
correct an error in the certificate of service and so does not call into question 
this Court's jurisdiction under Utah R. App. P. 4(a). 
24. R. at 302 & 317; Ruling 6:5-16. 
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on [his prescription drug use] is irrelevant."25 In his memorandum in sup-
port, Father alleged that even though he gave her a signed release form, 
Dr. Malovich nonetheless committed two third-degree felonies by obtain-
ing his records from the Controlled Substance Database and by releasing 
those records to both parties' counsel in response to a subpoena from Fa-
ther's counsel. 2G 
Judge Allphin denied this motion at the beginning of trial, stating 
as follows: 
You filed some interesting motions lately-sending me copies of 
things that you don't want me to consider ... ; arguing about re-
ports that are not generally admitted into evidence anyway; taking 
swipes at a prominent and very credible expert; making argument 
that assumes that the Court is either too stupid or lacks experience 
in these types of matters. I've been on the bench 23 years, hearing 
these kinds of cases. I know what I'm doing and I know what the 
most important things are in these cases. I guess it's up to you to 
determine whether or not you thinh I'm stupid, but based on what I 
read in your memoranda, ... it appears that this drug issue that 
you've been so involved in is an extremely small part of Dr. 
Malovich's factual basis for her conclusion and for her recommen-
dation .. . . I don't accept the petitioner's premise here that Dr. 
Malovich should be precluded from testifying to what she found. 
It's legitimate .. .. Petitioner and his witnesses can tell me, all day 
long, that regular controlled substance use ... [doesn't] affect the 
way a person approaches life, relationships, parenting, jobs, etc. I 
25. R. at 307-08. 
26. R. at 313-16; see Letter of April 19, 2012, infra at A-1. Because Fa-
ther does not challenge the trial court's denial of his motion to exclude, this 
letter establishes a background fact that is not strictly material to the ques-
tions on appeal. Therefore, Mother has not moved to have it entered into the 
appellate record but provides it for the Court's convenience only. 
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have twenty-three years of experience that tell me otherwise .... I 
certainly don't accept the basic premise that drug use of any kind, 
whether it's legitimate prescribed pain killers, don't have any af-
fect on what we're doing here because I think they probably do . ... 
The extent and whether or not it affects his ability to parent, that's 
what we're here to make a determination on. They may very well 
not, but are they important? Yes. Is it important that she brings 
that to the Court's attention? I think absolutely. 27 
II. FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT 
After hearing the evidence at trial, the Court made the following 
findings of fact with respect to his determination of legal and physical 
custody, the primary residence of the children, and parent time: 
Parental Income and Work History. At the time of their marriage in 
2003, the parties were both working at Convergys. 28 Mother gave birth to 
Son shortly after they were married and stopped working at the end of 
2003. 29 Father worked very little in 2004, and only made about $7,500 
that year. 30 Because this was not enough to support their family, Mother 
went back to work in late 2004.31 While Father argued that her motiva-
tion in working was to get additional spending money for herself, the trial 
court rejected this argument and found that Mother had to go back to 
27. Tr.1 6:21-8:18 (emphasis added). 
28. Ruling 10:6-14. 
29. Ruling 10:23-11:2. 
30. Ruling 11:2-5. 
31. Ruling 11:18-20. 
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work to support the family because Father was not doing his part.32 
Mother has worked full time from 2005 to the time of trial. 33 
Meanwhile, Father worked very little in 2005 and did not work at 
all in 2006. 34 While Father characterized this as being a stay-at-home dad 
and argued that it would cost more to pay for day care for the children 
than he could make in a minimum-wage job, 35 the trial court found that 
this was not a mutual decision by the parties; rather, because Father re-
fused to work, Mother agreed that he should babysit the children rather 
than having her pay for daycare out of her salary.36 Although Father 
stayed at home with the children, he rarely did more than tend them 
while Mother was at work- Mother made arrangements for the children's 
breakfast before she left for work, came home at lunch time to see that 
they were fed, and took care of their baths and other needs after work. 37 
Father stayed up late playing a lot of video games and slept late into the 
morning.38 
In 2007, the parties separated, and Mother told Father she was no 
longer willing to put up with a situation where she was the sole provider. 
32. Ruling 11:6-20. 
33. Ruling 13:2- 6, 14:2-3 & 8, 15:6- 7 & 24--25. 
34. Ruling 11:21-12:2, 13:1- 2. 
35. Tr.I 35:13-36:13. 
36. Ruling 12:3-11. 
37. Ruling 12:12-20, 13:8-13. 
38. Ruling 12:21-25, 13:14-19. 
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Father began to work, and they reconciled. 39 However, in 2008, Father 
again decided that he did not want to work any longer, and so babysat the 
children while gaming and pursuing other interests.40 Mother put the 
children in afternoon preschool and kindergarten because she was con-
cerned that Father would not be awake in time to get them ready for 
school.41 
Father did not work again until sometime during 2009, when he 
started a smoking-cessation business with some business partners he met 
through an online multiplayer video game:12 Father worked on this busi-
ness from home for about 5 to 20 hours per week, and did not take a wage 
or draw before the parties separated.43 After the parties separated, Fa-
ther decided that he needed an income, and so he and his partners agreed 
that in exchange for him storing the product and other business neces-
saries at his home , he would be paid $1,405.00 per month. 44 This ar-
rangement was ongoing to the time of trial. 45 
39. Ruling 13:20-14:1. 
40. Ruling 14:8- 14, 14:24-15:4. 
41. Ruling 14:15-23; Tr.1 105:-106:3. 
42. Ruling 7:17-19, 31:3-6. 
43. Ruling 15:18-23. 
44. Ruling 7:13-16, 7:23-8:16, 16:20-17:9. 
45. R. at 801 (~ 47). 
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Parental Residences. When the parties filed for divorce, they were 
residing in a two-bedroom apartment that they rented in Bountiful.4G Af-
ter the October 2010 temporary orders hearing, Mother moved out of the 
marital apartment and into a three-bedroom apartment in the lower floor 
of her parents' home in Taylorsville. 47 The apartment occupies the entire 
lower floor of the home and has its own private amenities. 48 Mother pays 
rent to her parents for the apartment.49 The children each have their own 
room and the apartment is appropriately furnished and decorated for the 
children. 50 There is a large yard on the property, with play equipment and 
a trampoline.51 Several of Mother's relatives live in close proximity, allow-
ing the children easy access to cousins and others to play with on a fre-
quent basis. 52 
Meanwhile, Father continued to reside in the two-bedroom apart-
ment with the children after the temporary orders hearing. 53 The children 
shared one room and Father slept on the couch so that he could use the 
46. Ruling 9:11-15. 
47. R. at 783-84 <ir,1 12-13). 
48. Ruling 9:15-18; Tr.2 208:10-23. 
49. Tr.2 209:16-18. 
50. Ruling 9:18- 23. 
51. Ruling 9:23-25. 
52. Ruling 10:1-5. 
53. Ruling 7:6-11. 
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master bedroom for storing business supplies. 54 After Dr. Malovich criti-
cized his living arrangements, Father's mother bought him a three-
bedroom home and gave him $13,000 in order to appropriately furnish 
and decorate it for the children. 55 The home is in a nice neighborhood, has 
a nice yard, and is within walking distance to the children's school. 56 Fa-
ther has no financial obligations to make mortgage payments or to pay 
rent to his mother on the home .57 
The trial court next examined the factors of Rule 4-903 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration:58 
Less Important Factors. The trial court found that the following fac-
tors named in Rule 4-903 were either of limited relevance under the cir-
cumstances of the case or did not substantially favor one parent over the 
other, and so were not given much weight in its final determination: the 
children's preferences;59 the benefit of keeping siblings together;60 the 
54. Ruling 7:11-16. 
55. Ruling 8:17-24. 
56. Ruling 8:25-9:5. 
57. Ruling 9:6-10. 
58. ·while the requirement to consider the 4-903 factors only applies to 
custody evaluators, see, e.g. , Williams v. Williams, 2001 UT App 330U (no. 
20000013, Nov. 8, 2001), these factors include all the factors that trial 
courts are required to consider under Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-10 & -10.2. 
59. R. at 790 (ii 32.a). 
60. R. at 790 (~ 32.b). 
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relative strength of the children's bond with each parent;61 reasons for 
having relinquished custody in the past;62 religious compatibility with the 
children;63 kinship;64 and evidence of abuse.65 
Interest in Continuing Previous Custody Arrangements. The trial 
court found that the children are doing well and functioning adequately in 
their custodial arrangement under the temporary order. 66 The court dis-
agreed with Dr. Malovich's concern regarding the children's grooming 
while with their father, and found that the children did not appear to be 
generally unkempt, poorly groomed, or wearing ill-fitting clothes as a 
regular occurrence while in their father's care.67 However, the court also 
found that the current amount of contact that the parties' youngest 
daughter has with Mother is not adequate for her needs.68 Further, the 
court rejected the argument of Father's expert witness that the court 
should not interfere with a custody arrangement if it was working as con-
trary to the responsibility of the court to act in the best interests of the 
61. R. at 790 (~ 32 .c). 
62. R. at 792 (if 32.e.v). 
63. R. at 792-93 (ii 32.e.vi). 
64. R. at 793 (ir 32.e.vii). 
65. R. at 794 (i[ 32.e.ix). 
66. Ruling 26:7-12. 
67. Ruling 26:25-27:12. 
68. Ruling 26:12-14. 
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children-While the interest in stability is weighty, the court would not 
grant it determinative effect.6D 
Capacity to Function as Parents. The trial court found that Father 
genuinely cares about the children, that he displays a strong motivation 
to be actively involved in their lives, and that he has made some major 
changes in his life from what he was doing 3-5 years ago to what was do-
ing at the time of trial. 70 After the parties' separation, Father has had 
more involvement with the children and started to play a significant role 
in their lives, becoming a primary caretaker for the children. 71 While the 
court found Father's efforts to develop his business commendable, it also 
found that his focus on remaining self-employed appeared to take prece-
dence over meeting his family's more immediate needs. 72 The court found 
that Mother genuinely loves the children and has consistently displayed a 
long-term commitment to their care and well-being even after the parties' 
separation and temporary order did not allow her to be as involved in the 
children's lives as she was during the marriage.73 The Court expressed no 
concerns regarding Mother's parenting style or ability to care for the chil-
dren.74 
69. Ruling 35:11-19. 
70. Ruling 21:2-10. 
71. Ruling 17:5-9. 
72. Ruling 21:11- 17. 
73. Ruling 22:23-23:5. 
74. Ruling 23:18-21. 
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Moral Character and Emotional Stability. The trial court found that 
both parents possess the moral character and judgment necessary to 
model appropriate behavior and instill moral values in their children. 75 
However, the court noted that Father struggled emotionally at the begin-
ning of the parties' separation and unnecessarily involved the children in 
his emotional distress, as well as inappropriately blaming Mother for the 
divorce in front of the children, which ca used some distress in the chil-
dren's lives.76 The Court found no concerns about Ms. Fullmer's emotional 
stability. 77 
Duration and Depth of Desire for Custody. The trial court found that 
both parties have had a long-standing commitment to be involved in the 
children's lives for the last two years since the parties separated. 78 How-
ever, Father did not demonstrate a real depth and desire to be fully in-
volved in the children's lives for the years prior to the parties' separa-
tion.79 
Personal vs. Surrogate Care. The trial court found that Father is 
not employed outside the home and is able to care for the children on a 
full-time basis with minimum need for surrogate care.80 As Mother is em-
75. Ruling 27:17-20. 
76. Ruling 27:21- 28:3. 
77. Ruling 28:4-6 . 
78. Ruling 28:8-12, 20-23. 
79. Ruling 28:12-20. 
80. Ruling 28:25-29:3. 
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ployed full time outside the home and maintains a traditional work 
schedule, she would require the use of surrogate care after school hours.81 
Substance Abuse Concerns. The trial court found that there was 
not sufficient evidence to conclude that Father's use of prescription medi-
cations in the last two years since the parties separation has impaired his 
parenting, endangered the parties' children, or progressed to the point of 
addiction or moving on to harder drugs.82 There was evidence that he took 
high quantities of controlled substances for pain prior to the parties' sepa-
ration that may have contributed to his general lack of interest in caring 
for the children during the marriage. 83 
Financial Condition. The trial court noted its concerns about Fa-
ther's financial stability. 84 There was no evidence presented at trial as to 
the revenues or value of the business, the partnership agreement or fi. 
nancial arrangements between the partners, the nature of Father's re-
sponsibilities with regard to the business, or the identity of Father's busi-
ness partners.85 Due to the lack of evidence presented about the busi-
ness's financial condition, the court expressed a lack of confidence that 
81. Ruling 29:3- 6. 
82. Ruling 29:13-30:8. 
83. Ruling 30:9-12. 
84. Ruling 31:3-17. 
85. Ruling 7:17-22, 15:12-18, 21:18-22:4, 31:16-21. 
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Father could continue to take the $1 ,400 per month draw from the busi-
ness.86 The court expressed no concerns over Mother's financial stability.87 
Ability to Support Relationship with the Other Parent. The trial court 
found that the parties' two minor children would benefit from an ongoing 
positive relationship with both their mother and their father, including 
regular and predictable parent time with both of them.88 The court fur-
ther found that it is extremely important for the children's self-worth and 
emotional health for each parent to support the children's relationship 
with the other parent, to encourage the children to love and respect the 
other parent, to build up the other parent in the minds of the children.89 
The court further found concerns with Father's ability to play a 
positive supporting role in the children's relationship with Mother.90 In 
addition to his past issues of blaming her for the divorce in front of the 
children, Father's position with respect to Mother's parent time was in-
consistent: on one hand, Father testified that he wants the children to be 
able to see Mother as much as possible, but on the other, he believed that 
the interim parent-time schedule was too disruptive and maintained that 
minim um parent time was in the best interest of the children. 91 The court 
86. Ruling 31:23-32:3. 
87. Ruling 32:4-10. 
88. Ruling 17:22-18:6. 
89. Ruling 18:7-19: 12. 
90. Ruling 32: 17-25. 
91. Ruling 33:1-16. 
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found that Mother demonstrated a good ability to be supportive of the 
children's relationship with Father despite their personal differences and 
appeared to support them in special events that occur during Father's 
parent time.92 
Best Interests of the Children. After making the above findings , the 
trial court determined that it was in the children's best interest to move 
their primary residence from Father's home to Mother's home.93 The court 
acknowledged that this change would lead to some disruption of the chil-
dren's schooling, activities, and domestic situation, 94 but found that the 
negative effects of that disruption would be mitigated by the children's 
young age , the fact that Mother's home is appropriate for the children, 
she has family members and friends and other appropriate contacts for 
the children to have, and the school in her area appears appropriate. 95 
Additionally, the court found that the effects of the disruption were out-
weighed, as Mother has been the most positive and primary influence in 
the children's lives, the children desire to have more contact with her, she 
has been the most responsible parent and the financial provider for the 
household, and she had the ability to provide a loving, nurturing home for 
92. Ruling 23:6-9. 
93. Ruling 35:20-23. 
94. Ruling 33:25-34:5. 
95. Ruling 35:1-10. 
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the children where it was more certain that the relationship with Father 
would be supported and fostered as well. 96 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In his brief, Father asks the Court to reverse the trial court's cus-
tody and parent-time determination based on the following arguments: 
First, Father argues that Judge Allphin was biased in favor of Dr. 
Malovich, the custody evaluator, and so gave her opinion undue weight. 
However, because Father failed to file a motion to disqualify at the trial 
court level at any time, this issue is not reviewable. Also, even if the 
plain-error doctrine did apply, Father did not show any of the required 
elements of plain error in his brief. Second, Father argues that the trial 
court's custody and parent-time determination was an abuse of discretion. 
However, Father fails to marshal the evidence in favor of the decision, 
and fails to develop a coherent analysis of the findings that would show 
why the ultimate finding of custody and parent time is unsupportable, he 
fails to meet his burden. Because Father has failed to meet his burden 
and failed to properly brief the issues he raises, this Court should affirm 
and award :Mother her attorney fees for the necessity of defending against 
this appeal. 
96. Ruling 34:5-25, 35:11-19. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THERE ARE NO GROUNDS TO REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ON 
THE BASIS THAT JUDGE ALLPHIN FAILED TO RECUSE HIMSELF SUA SPONTE. 
Father's first claim of error is that Judge Allphin exhibited disquali-
fying bias and should have recused himself. While Father admits that he 
made no objection at trial and the record shows that he did not file a mo-
tion to disqualify under Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Fa-
ther nonetheless argues that the Court should apply the plain error doc-
trine to review the issue. However, as explained in Part I.A, Utah appel-
late courts have consistently held that filing a motion and affidavit under 
Rule 63(b) is a prerequisite to appellate review, meaning Father's as-
signment of error is not reviewable. 
Moreover, Father's claim that Judge Allphin's failure to recuse him-
self sua, sponte was plain error fails on its merits. A party arguing plain 
error bears the burden of demonstrating that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence 
in the verdict is undermined."97 As explained below in Parts I.B through 
I.D, Father fails to prove that there is error, that any error would be 
plain, or that any error would have been harmful. Because Father fails to 
97. Spafford v. Granite Credit Union , 2011 UT App 401, ~ 42, 266 P.3d 
866. 
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show even one of these elements, the Court should reject his argument for 
reversal on grounds of bias. 
A. Father's claim of bias is unreviewable because filing a motion and 
affidavit under Rule 63(b) is a necessary prerequisite to appellate 
review. 
Father argues that the Court should review his claim that the trial 
judge should have disqualified himself despite his failure to file a motion 
and affidavit under Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
only excuse he offers for his failure to do so is that "the bias did not show 
itself until after trial began."98 However, this Court has previously held in 
its decision of In re Estate of Valarce 99 that failure to file an affidavit un-
der Rule 63(b) precludes appellate review of a disqualification claim. In 
Valaree, the appellant attempted to raise for the first time on appeal the 
issue of whether the trial judge should have recused himself from the case 
because he had worked for the same firm where [a key witness] was a 
partner." 100 The appellant acknowledged that he had not filed a motion 
and affidavit under Rule 63(b) below, but argued that the Court "should 
consider this issue because he was unaware of the trial judge's alleged 
employment at Thorne's law firm until after his appeal was filed." 101 The 
Court rejected the appellant's argument and held that a party is not ex-
98. Br. Father 36. 
99. In re Estate of Valaree, 2013 UT App 95, 301 P.3d 1031. 
100. Id. at ii 38. 
101. Id. at ii 40. 
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cused from compliance with Rule 63(b) even if it does not discover facts 
sufficient to show bias, prejudice or conflict of interest until after the 
judgment is entered. Rather, 
when a party discovers facts supporting the disqualification of the 
trial judge after judgment is entered, the proper procedure is to file 
a motion for relief from judgment, similar to the relief available 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). By pursuing relief from 
judgment in the trial court, factual issues raised by Appellant can 
be explored and resolved, including the basis of Appellant's allega-
tions, the time when Appellant knew or should have known of the 
information, and the trial judge's involvement with Thorne's law 
firm. Based on that factual record, the trial court can then deter-
mine whether the participation of the trial judge warrants a new 
trial. Furthermore, the rule 60(b) hearing and decision will create 
a factual record for appellate review .... Unlike a trial court, we 
do not find facts, and our review is limited to the factual record de-
veloped in the trial court. Therefore, we decline to consider Appel-
lant's claim that the trial judge should have recused himself from 
serving in this matter.102 
Like the appellant in Valcarce, Father did not file a motion or affi-
davit under Rule 63(b) at any time before judgment, despite the fact that 
they learned of Judge Allphin's alleged bias on September 19, 2012 and a 
final judgment was not entered until three months later on December 20, 
2012. Nor did father file a motion to disqualify and affidavit along with a 
102. Id. at ilif 42-43; see also Straley v. Halliday, 2000 UT 38, i i 9, 997 
P.2d 338 (holding that "a party alleging judicial bias or prejudice must first 
file an affidavit to that effect in the trial court," and that failure to do so 
precludes appeal of the issue); Melvin v. Baher, 2007 UT App 234U at 3-4 
(no . 20060643, July 6, 2007) (holding that appellant's "failure to timely file a 
motion to disqualify is fatal to his claim on appeal" notwithstanding his 
claim of plain error). 
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motion to set aside at any time in the fifteen months since judgment was 
entered, even though Father raised this as an issue in his docketing 
statement of February 7, 2013. Father has squandered every opportunity 
to ask the trial court to develop a factual record on this issue, and t his 
Court should decline to take up the issue for the first time on appeal. 
B. Judge Al/phin's failure to recuse himself was not error. 
Utah law requires a judge «to disqualify himself or herself in any 
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned."103 Whether a judge's impartiality may reasonably be questioned 
is determined by viewing the question through the eyes of "a reasonable 
person, knowing all the circumstances."104 This test requires putting iso-
lated remarks in their proper context before determining whether they 
evince bias. 105 
In his brief, Father attempts to characterize Judge Allphin's re-
marks at the beginning of trial as defending Dr. Malovich's credibility and 
demonstrating bias against any attempt to question that credibility. In so 
doing, Father completely decontextualizes the comments. As explained in 
Part I of the Statement of Facts, supra, Judge Allphin was addressing Fa-
103. Utah Code Jud. Conduct 2.11. 
104. West Jordan City v. Goodman , 2006 UT 27, if 22, 135 P.3d 874. 
105. See Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sau. & Loan Assn., 767 P.2d 538, 547 
(Utah 1988) (explaining that, when viewed in context, a trial judge's remark 
that he had "cussed financial institutions" was "simply a statement about 
an attitude he had had many years earlier" and not indicative of bias). 
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ther's motion in limine to exclude her. In this context, it is clear that 
Judge Allphin's statement about "taking swipes at a prominent and very 
credible expert" refers not to Father's "motion to exclude [Dr. Malovich's] 
report" 10G itself, but rather the accusation within that motion that she had 
committed two third-degree felonies. Likewise, it is clear that Judge All-
phin's statement that "I guess it's up to you to determine whether or not 
you think I'm stupid" refers not to Father's "retaining an expert to con-
tradict [Dr.] Malovich," 107 but rather Father's argument "that regular con-
trolled substance use ... [doesn't] affect the way a person approaches life, 
relationships, parenting, jobs, etc." 108 While this language may have been 
somewhat harsh, a fact that Judge Allphin acknowledged at the end of 
trial, 109 "mere expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and 
even anger, are insufficient to establish the existence of bias or partial-
ity."110 
Moreover, the standard for disqualification based on a judge's com-
ments is very high: 
Any judicial comment or ruling gives the appearance of partiality 
in the broadest sense to the adversely affected party. Suppose a 
judge who is the trier of fact comments during a hearing that a 
106. Br. Father 2 (if 2). 
107. Br. Father 2 Ci[ 3). 
108. Tr.l 8:1-5. 
109. Tr.3 233:7-25. 
110. Campbell, Maach & Sessions v. Debry, 2001 UT App 397, ii 25, 38 
P.3d 984. 
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parent has had the opportunity to improve himself in order to 
make a home for his child but has made no effort to do so. Can the 
judge be disqualified for bias and prejudice? Whenever a judge 
hears any evidence, he develops an attitude which may change as 
the evidence develops. As long as the judge decides the case only 
after all the evidence is submitted, there appears to be no harm in 
such a comment. Such judicial comments made before a jury would 
constitute an improper expression of opinion on the evidence, but 
those statements made out of their hearing do not require 
recusal. 111 
The two cases from Florida that Father references actually illus-
trate the two circumstances in which a comment can lead to disqualifica-
tion. In Barnett v. Barnett, the judge's comment made before closing ar-
guments that a party "should attempt to negotiate for more visitation 
than she would otherwise receive if the trial court made the decision" 112 
strongly suggested that the court had made its final decision before the 
submission of evidence. In Whitaher v. State, the judge's comment was be-
fore a criminal jury and so constituted an improper comment. 113 
However, in this case, there was no indication that the trial court 
had decided any of the issues presented-in fact , immediately after the 
statements in question, Judge Allphin stated that he did not "come to this 
111. Madsen, 767 P.2d at 546 (quoting Leslie W. Abramson, Judicial Dis-
qualification nnder Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct 23 (1986)). 
112. Barnett v. Barnett, 727 So. 2d 311, 311 (Fla. App. 1999). 
113. Whitaher v. State, 742 So.2d 530, 530 (Fla. App. 1999). As a side 
note, Mother observes that the Whitalier court does not give the facts behind 
the motion to recuse, nor indicate whether it involved the judge's comments 
about the officer. 
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case with any preconceived ideas about what the outcome may be,"114 and 
that while he respected Dr. Malovich's expertise, he did not always agree 
with her conclusions: "I believe she works hard at providing honest infor-
mation that will assist the Court . ... [S]ometimes, it's information that I 
find very helpful, and other times, I have a different opinion than she 
does after I've heard all the evidence." 115 Moreover, even if it may have 
been an improper comment on an expert's credibility had a jury been pre-
sent, this was a bench trial. 
It could be argued that it was not clear from the record exactly what 
Judge Allphin was referring to in his remarks or that Judge Allphin's 
statements of impartiality should not be taken at face value. However, 
because these arguments require determinations of credibility and mak-
ing factual findings , the place to make these arguments was in a motion 
brought under Rule 63(b), so that an adequate record could be made for 
appellate review. As it was Father's job to make sure that record was 
made, any deficiency in that record must be construed against finding 
bias. 
Finally, the fact that Judge Allphin had heard from Dr. Malovich in 
previous cases and respected her expertise does not constitute grounds for 
disqualification. The Utah Supreme Court previously noted that 
114. Tr.I 8:19-24. 
115. Tr.I 9:8-18. 
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although litigants are entitled to a judge who will hear both sides 
and decide an issue on the merits of the law and the evidence pre-
sented, they are not entitled to a judge whose mind is a clean slate. 
Each judge brings to the bench the experiences of life, both per-
sonal and professional. A lifetime of experiences that have gener-
ated a number of general attitudes cannot be left in chambers 
when a judge takes the bench.116 
Judge Allphin has been a district court judge for 17 years, and was a do-
mestic relations commissioner for six years before that. 117 Given that 
amount of time, one can expect that he has heard from certain custody 
evaluators multiple times and has developed opinions about their work. 
In fact, it would be disconcerting if he did not. So long as there is no evi-
dence of "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair 
judgment impossible," 118 there is no basis for recusal based on having 
previously heard from an expert witness. 
C. As there is no settled law in Utah with respect to recusal based 
on judicial comments, any error was not plain. 
Second, even if there were error, it was not plain. "Utah courts have 
repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not plain where there is no set-
tled appellate law to guide the trial court." 119 Father admits in his brief 
that "Utah cases applying [Rule 2.11] do not analyze bias based on a 
116. Madsen, 767 P.2d at 546. 
117. Tr.3 230:22-231:1. 
118. Debry, 2001 UT App 397 at if 25. 
119. Spafford, 2011 UT App 401 at i f 42. 
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judge's comments."120 Mother concurs that in researching the issue, she 
has not become aware of any case where a Utah appellate court has de-
cided that a judge's comments gave rise to a reasonable question of his or 
her impartiality. Without settled appellate law on the issue, any error 
could not be plain under Utah law. Therefore, Father's claim of plain er-
ror fails. 
D. Any error was not harmfui, as there is no indication that another 
judge hearing the same evidence likely would have made findings 
that would have materially altered the result in Father's favor. 
An error is harmful only if, by the end of considering the effect of 
the error, the Court determines that the "likelihood of a different outcome 
[is] sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict."121 In his 
brief, Father does not point to any specific element of the trial court's de-
cision that was likely to have come out differently had the judge recused 
himself. Instead, he simply asserts: "It is clear the judge's bias may well 
have had an impact on the final outcome."122 This is a one-sentence asser-
tion provided in lieu of an argument, which is not adequate to show harm-
ful error and not in compliance with the appellate briefing rules. 123 Fur-
120. Br. Father 37. 
121. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 832, 840 (Utah 1992). 
122. Br. Father 39. 
123. See Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207, 
~ 17 n.5 , 186 P.3d 1012 (noting that an argument consisting of a one-
sentence assertion that an action on the part of the other side was improper 
did "not comply with appellate briefing rules"). 
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ther, as shown below, Father fails to properly marshal the evidence, 
which would be a prerequisite to showing that the trial court's findings 
were close questions, and that another judge hearing the same evidence 
likely would have made findings that would have materially altered the 
result in Father's favor. Finally, as shown below in Part II.B, the deci-
sions that Father ascribes to bias are supported by a great deal of evi-
dence. Father fails to make his case for harmful error, and his claim of 
disqualifying bias must be rejected. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF CUSTODY AND PARENT TIME WAS WELL 
WITHIN ITS BROAD DISCRETION; A NEW TRIAL IS NOT WARRANTED. 
In making child custody awards, the trial court is given broad dis-
cretion and its decisions will not be overturned absent an abuse of discre-
tion or manifest injustice. 124 This discretion is limited by the following 
threshold requirements: first , the trial court's discretion "must be exer-
cised within the confines of the legal standards set by the appellate 
courts." 125 Second, "to ensure the court acted within its broad discretion, 
the facts and reasons for the court's decision must be set forth in appro-
124. Schindler, 776 P.2d at 87; see Tucher, 910 P.2d at 1214 ("Only where 
the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discre-
tion will an appellate court interpose its own judgment."). 
125. Schindler, 776 P .2d at 87; see Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 196 
(Utah App. 1992) (explaining that the legal standards set by the appellate 
courts are based on Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10, and noting that "there is no 
checklist of custody factors, since these factors are highly personal and indi-
vidual, and do not lend themselves to the means of generalization employed 
in other areas of the law."). 
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priate findings of fact and conclusions of law." 12G If these threshold re-
quirements are met, the party challenging the court's determination of 
custody bears the burden to prove that the court's ultimate finding that a 
custody arrangement is in the best interests of the children is "so lacking 
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence."127 
While Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its 
determination of custody and parent time, he does not claim that the trial 
court failed to analyze the custody question within the standards set by 
appellate courts, nor does he claim that the trial court's findings were in-
sufficient. Therefore, Father bears the burden of showing that the trial 
court's ultimate finding was in clear error. As Father fails to properly 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's ultimate and subsidi-
ary findings and fails to develop a coherent analysis of the findings that 
would show why the ultimate finding of custody and parent time is un-
supportable, he fails to meet his burden. The Court should affirm the trial 
court's award of custody and parent time. 
126. Schindler, 776 P.2d at 87; see Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 
(Utah App. 1993) ("To ensure that the trial court's determination, discre-
tionary as it is, is rationally based, it is essential that the court set forth in 
its findings of fact not only that it finds one parent to be the better person to 
care for the child, but also the basic facts which show why that ultimate 
conclusion is justified."). 
127. A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT 
App 87, if 26, 977 P.2d 518; see Cagatay v. Erturk, 2013 UT App 82, ii 3, 302 
P .3d 137 (holding that a party's challenge to a trial court's award of joint 
custody failed because the party "fail[ed] to demonstrate that the trial 
court's findings were clearly erroneous .... "). 
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A. Father has failed to adequately marshal the evidence in support 
of the finding that the custody arrangement is in the best interests 
of the children or for in support of subsidiary findings. 
In order to challenge a trial court's finding that a custody arrange-
ment is in the best interests of the children, a party ''must first marshal 
all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it 
in a light most favorable to the court below ." 128 The marshaling process 
contains three steps: first , the party must identify the ultimate factual 
finding it wishes to challenge in the argument section of the brief. 129 Sec-
ond, directly after identifying that finding, 130 the party "must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports" that ultimate finding, including evi-
dence supporting subsidiary findings. 131 Finally, "after constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a 
128. Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, ,r 25, 112 P.3d 495. 
129. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (identifying marshaling requirement as 
part of the argument section of the brief); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P .2d 
301, 304 (Utah App. 1987) (noting that a party failed to meet his burden to 
marshal in part because "the requisite presentation of supporting evidence 
is also not found in the argument portion of appellant's brief.") . 
130. Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, ii 47 n.11, 54 P.3d 1119 ("To comply 
with the marshaling requirement, appellants must marshal all of the favor-
able evidence at the point at which they challenge the factual finding."); see 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 
1991) ("What the City has not done is to correlate particular items of evi-
dence with the challenged findings .... "). 
131. Parduhn, 2005 UT 22 at ii 25. 
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fatal flaw in the evidence" which is "sufficient to convince the appellate 
court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly errone-
ous."132 
Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have pointed out on 
numerous occasions that a "general catalogue of evidence" that presents 
evidence favorable to both parties and does not "correlate particular items 
of evidence with the challenged findings" does not satisfy the marshaling 
burden. 133 Rather, "Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the cli-
ent's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position." 134 \Vhile some at-
torneys have balked at this way of describing the marshaling burden, say-
ing it compromises zealous advocacy, this formulation is another way of 
saying that in order for a party to show that a finding is clearly errone-
ous, the party must first honestly and objectively represent the finding 
rather than attacking a caricature or strawman finding. Avoiding straw-
men and representing an opponent's argument objectively is just good ar-
gumentation, and the Court should insist on parties' compliance. 
Utah appellate courts have insisted on strict compliance with the 
marshaling requirement to promote the objectives of efficiency and fair-
ness: 
132. Majestic Inv. , 818 P.2d at 1315. 
133. Majestic Inv ., 818 P.2d at 1315; see Roderich, 2002 UT 84 at ~ 47 
n.11; A.K.& R. Whipple, 1999 UT App 87 at if 26; Fitzgerald, 7 44 P.2d at 
304. 
134. Majestic Inv. , 818 P .2d at 1315. 
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Efficient resolution of disputes demands that, unless the facts 
found by the trial court are clearly erroneous, they will be upheld 
on appeal. ... Successful challenges to findings of fact thus must 
demonstrate to appellate courts first how the trial court found the 
facts from the evidence and second why such findings contradict 
the weight of the evidence. These demonstrations in appellants' 
briefs not only avoid retrying the facts but also assist us in our de-
cision-making and opinion-writing, thus increasing our effi-
ciency .... Additionally, the deference we afford to trial courts' fac-
tual findings is based on and fosters the principle that appellants 
rather than appellees bear the greater burden on appeal. ... When 
appellants challenge findings of fact, fairness requires that they 
bear the costs of demonstrating how the trial court found those 
facts from the evidence and why those findings contradict the 
weight of the evidence. 135 
If a party fails to fulfill the marshaling burden, the appellate court as-
sumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court and accepts 
the findings as valid.13G 
In this case, while Father acknowledges his burden to marshal the 
evidence, 137 his purported marshaling of the evidence is just a general 
catalogue of evidence summarizing the testimony at trial. As this Court 
stated in Majestic Investments when it rejected a similar catalogue of evi-
dence: "The marshaling concept does not reflect a desire to merely have 
pertinent excerpts from the record readily available to a reviewing 
135. Oneida / SLIC u. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc. , 872 P.2d 
1051, 1053-54 (Utah App. 1994). 
136. Crochett v. Crochett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992). 
137. Br. Father 1. 
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court." 138 Father fails to correlate evidence to particular findings that he 
challenges, and fails to put it in the portion of the argument section of his 
brief where he challenges the trial court's findings. In so doing, Father 
fails to uphold his burden to show why the findings contradict the weight 
of the evidence, shifting the burden of any weighing to this Court. The 
Court should decline to become the "depository in which the appealing 
party may dump the burden of argument and research" 139 and accept the 
trial court's findings as valid. 
B. The trial courrs findings were not clearly erroneous1 and the 
courf s final determination of custody and parent time was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
But even if this Court were to overlook Father's failure to properly 
marshal the evidence and exercise its discretion "to consider independ-
ently the whole record and determine if the decision below has adequate 
factual support,"140 there is still no cause to conclude that the trial court 
acted beyond his discretion in making the custody and parent-time de-
termination. Father makes no attempt to analyze whether the trial 
court's determination was abuse of discretion in any systematic way-it is 
unclear whether Father is trying to argue that certain findings were 
clearly erroneous or that the district court gave improper weight to cer-
tain factors . Rather, Father's argument appears to be a series of general-
138. Majestic Inv. , 818 P.2d at 1315. 
139. Spafford, 2011 UT App 401 at ,r 25. 
140. Martinez v. M edia-Paymaster Plus , 2007 UT 42, ,r 20, 164 P .3d 384. 
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ized grievances with particular findings and an impermissible attempt to 
reargue evidence. 141 As such, it is very difficult for Mother to do more 
than generally argue in favor of the trial court's discretion. Mother asks 
the Court to reject any attempts by Father to reform and redraft Point 2 
of his Argument in his reply brief, as it would lead to a procedurally un-
fair situation. 142 
Father's objections to the trial court's custody and parent-time de-
termination seem to be as follows: 
" The court's award of parent time was exactly as proposed by Dr. 
Malovich, which shows bias. 
The trial court did not adopt Dr. Malovich's suggestion "exactly"-
rather, he rejected her plan to alternate midweek days between Monday 
and Thursday. 143 The trial court indicates that its choice of schedule is 
based on its agreement with Father's argument that "regardless of which 
parent obtains primary custody, ... it would be in the children's best in-
terest to have a more consistent schedule with fewer transitions."144 
Moreover, it does not appear that there were a whole lot of other options 
141. See Oneida, 872 P.2d at 1053 (rejecting an appellant's tactic of "re-
argu[ing] the case before this court") . 
142. See Maak v. II-IC Health Servs. , 2007 UT App 244, if 30, 166 P.3d 631 
(declining to address issues raised for the first time in a reply brief in order 
"to prevent the resulting unfairness to the respondent if an argument or is-
sue was first raised in the reply brief and the respondent had no opportu-
nity to respond"). 
143. Ruling 36:20-37:15. 
144. Ruling 37:5-8. 
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with respect to parent time. As Dr. Malovich explained, between the time 
it would take for the non-custodial parent to drop off the children at their 
school and Mother's traditional 8 to 5 job, there was not a whole lot of 
flexibility with respect to the schedule during the school year. 145 Finally, 
the only other proposal explicitly on the table was Father's proposal that 
Mother get minimum standard time during the school year. 146 The trial 
court's adoption of most of Dr. Malovich's parent-time recommendation 
reflects not bias, but rather both the court and custody evaluator's recog-
nition that this was the most workable schedule. 
• The court relied on Dr. Malovich 's finding that the amount of time that 
the children spent with their mother was not adequate for Daughter's 
needs, even though it was based on information that was out of date. 
The court's finding that Daughter needed more time with Mother 
was based on the report of Dr. Malovich, who last interviewed the chil-
dren in August of 2011. Father states that "the glowing report of [Daugh-
ter]'s school teacher, [Ms.] Miller, of the scout leader [Ms. Kyes] and the 
neighbor [Ms. Waite?] are all current information of [Daughter]'s adjust-
ment to the custodial arrangement with their father." 147 Father does not 
give any citation to the record as to these "glowing reports," but it does 
145. Tr.3 142:16-143:8. 
146. Tr.I 129:25-130:21. 
147. Br. Father 41-42. 
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not appear that any of these witnesses testified as to their opinions on the 
question or any observations that they made on the subject. 148 
Moreover, Dr. Malovich's conclusion that Daughter needed more 
contact with Mother was based on her observation that Daughter "dis-
plays a sometimes emotionally needy style and some separation anxiety 
in regard to [Mother] suggesting that the current amount of contact she 
has with her is not adequate for her needs." 149 None of these witnesses 
regularly witnessed Mother and Daughter interacting, and so could not 
testify as to any dinginess daughter had toward Mother. Ms. Kyes was 
Son's scout leader, and did not deal with Daughter except when she and 
Father were there together with Son at pack events. Also, if the neighbor 
Father refers to is Ms. Waites, she never testified about Daughter at all, 
and any know ledge she had about the children would have been limited to 
the time she had been Father's neighbor: October 2010 to September 
2011-her information would be no more current than Dr. Malovich's in-
formation. In fact, if her "glowing report" was based on information from 
the same timeframe that Dr. Malovich observed Daughter's emotionally 
needy style, it discounts the conclusion that later "glowing reports" signify 
a change in Daughter's emotional needs. 
148. See Tr.I 218:12-225:24 (lVIs. Kyes); 244:2-250:4 (lVIs. v\Taite); 250:11-
275:23 (Ms. Miller). 
149. Tr.I 134:1-7. 
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Father cites no record evidence that would contradict Dr. Malovich's 
conclusion that the children want to spend more time with their mother, 
and Mother knows of none. Father also gives no reason to believe that 
Daughter's needs had changed in the time between Dr. Malovich's report 
and the time of trial. The custody evaluator and the trial court can only 
work on the information that they have. If a party believes that informa-
tion does not take into account some significant changes, it is that party's 
responsibility to present that evidence to the court and/or custody evalua-
tor. General "glowing reports" during and after the time of the custody 
evaluation is not enough for this Court to conclude that the district court's 
finding that Daughter's need for more time with Mother persisted from 
the time of the custody evaluation to the present. 
• The court improperly found concerns with Father's ability to support 
the children's relationship with Mother. 
Father objects to this because Father's act of blaming Mother for 
the divorce "was conduct that occurred in 2010, at least two years prior to 
trial." 150 The trial court found that Father inappropriately blamed Mother 
for the divorce in front of the children. Father acknowledged 
talking to the children about the fact that he didn't want the di-
vorce, that this was their mom's choice. He seemed to feel that that 
would be a more honest response than to share responsibility for 
the separation or divorce in talking with the children. So, he was 
quite open about the fact that he had been open with the children 
about that issue, that he did not take responsibility for the divorce 
150. Br. Father 42. 
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with the children and, clearly, indicated to them that it was their 
mom's choice. 151 
However, rather than being an isolated incident, Dr. Malovich 
viewed this incident as part of a larger concern that Father "displays little 
insight into how his communication has impacted the children's responses 
and feelings regarding their mother, as well as added to their emotional 
distress." 152 Dr. Malovich describes more incidents that validate that con-
cern in her testimony, including the river-rafting event. 153 The trial court 
also indicated that its concerns were boosted by his proposed parent-time 
schedule, which would have cut quite a bit of Mother's parent time from 
the temporary order. 154 While Father indicated that he would be flexible 
to provide Mother with more parent time in addition, Dr. Malovich noted 
that "if a parent isn't willing to commit to that time ... in some sort of 
more structured way, trying to leave extra time as something that the 
parties negotiate," it is cause for concern. 155 In short, the trial court was 
right to have concerns about Father's ability to support Mother's relation-
ship with the children. 
151. Tr.3 91:6-15. 
152. Tr.3 99:7-11. 
153. See Tr.3 98:25-103:3. 
154. Ruling 32:16-33:16. 
155. Tr.3 123:18-124:4. 
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• The court improperly found that during the marriage, Father merely 
"babysat" the children and did not display a real depth of desire to be 
involved in the children's fives. 
Father objects to the trial court's finding, but it is unclear whether 
his motive is to show that he was a caretaker for the children during the 
marriage, or just to register his offense at being called a babysitter. Re-
gardless, the trial court's finding was backed by the trial court's subsidi-
ary findings that he does not challenge- namely, that Mother made ar-
rangements for the children's breakfast before she left for work, came 
home at lunch time to see that they were fed, and took care of their baths 
and other needs after work, and that Father stayed up late playing a lot 
of video games, slept late into the morning, and although he stayed at 
home with the children, he rarely did anything to actually address their 
needs during that time. 156 Although the trial court indicates that Father 
has developed a commitment toward the children since the time of the 
temporary order, the trial court's conclusion that the commitment was not 
there before the parties separated is not clearly erroneous. 
• The court improperly found that Father's prescription drug use may 
have contributed to his lack of interest in caring for the children. 
Father objects to this finding on grounds that there is "no medical 
evidence to support" it. 157 However, there was a great deal of evidence 
that Father was taking large amounts of hydrocodone and other opioid 
156. Ruling 12:3-20, 13: 18-13, 14:8-15:4. 
157 Br. Father 42. 
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pain relievers. 158 Father's dentist, Dr. Kennington, testified that people 
who take hydrocodone often become sleepy, dizzy, and nauseated. 159 
There does not need to be further evidence to allow the trial court to make 
a connection between probable side effects of a medicine to behavior that 
was exhibited. The court's finding was not clearly erroneous. 
• The cowt's concerns over Father's income and financial stability were 
improper. 
The court had every right to be concerned about the continuation of 
Father's income from a business that was less than two years old at the 
time of trial, as there was no evidence presented at trial as to the reve-
nues or value of the business, the partnership agreement or financial ar-
rangements between the partners, the nature of Father's responsibilities 
with regard to the business, or the identity of Father's business part-
ners.160 Without this evidence, there is no way for the court to determine 
whether Father was getting paid from profits or investment money, and if 
the latter, how long that reserve of money would last. It was Father's re-
sponsibility to put on this evidence. 
Father argues that "a mother who remained home with young chil-
dren would be lauded as a primary caregiver" and implies that the trial 
158. Tr.2 37:7-40:1. 
159. Tr.2 31:19-32:13. 
160. Ruling 7:17- 22, 15:12- 18, 21:18- 22:4, 31:16-21. 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
40 Mar. 21 , 2014 
Case no . 20130060-CA 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court was applying an improper sex-based double standard. 161 He adds 
that the trial court had no rational basis for concern because the evidence 
showed "that [Father] could live on his income, due to residing in a fully 
paid home for which he owed no rent." 162 However, financial stability is 
not about whether parents can live on income, it is about whether parents 
can adequately provide for their children. Father has a history of showing 
an alarming lack of concern for the financial needs of his family , choosing 
to stay home and play video games while his family skids by at less than 
150% of the poverty line. 163 In such circumstances, being a stay-at-home 
parent, whether a mother or father , is just not practical. Regardless of 
whether Father has the house his mother bought him for his rent-free 
use, the children still need food, clothing and other necessities, not to 
mention what they will need as they grow up , such as band instruments 
or sports-team uniforms. Working 5-20 hours a week at a business with 
no proven track record does not indicate a recognition of the children's 
present and future needs, and the trial court was right to be concerned 
161. Br . Father 42. 
162. Br. Father 42-43. 
163. The poverty line for a family of four in 2009 and 2010 was $22,050. 
See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4199 (Jan. 
23, 2009) ; Delayed Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines for the Remain-
der of 2010, 75 Fed. Reg. 45628 (Aug. 3, 2010). The family's income for 2009 
and 2010 was $32,387 and $31,974, respectively. R. at 785. 
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that Father's focus on remaining self-employed appeared to take prece-
dence over meeting his family's more immediate needs. 164 
Finally, Father argues that Dr. Malovich "attacked [him] for resid-
ing in a home purchased by his mother, and for doing so after the report," 
which he claims shows her bias against him. 165 In reality, Dr. Malovich 
stated that she thought it was good that the children had more space and 
any positive changes made after the custody evaluation that help the 
children are commendable, but that she hesitated to give too much weight 
to him moving into a new house, as he did not resolve the concern by his 
independent efforts to provide for the children, and as there was always a 
question about changes subsequent to the custody evaluation as being 
done in an effort to influence the final custody result rather than out of 
concern for the best interest of the children. 166 These are legitimate con-
cerns, especially given the pattern of Father being unconcerned about 
providing for his children's financial needs. 
• The court gave insufficient weight to preserving the custody arrange-
ments made under the temporary orders. 
Finally, Father argues that the trial court ignored or discounted the 
negative effects that the children would suffer as a result of moving their 
primary residence, including changing schools, leaving some friends, and 
164. Ruling 21:11-17. 
165. Br. Father at 43. 
166. Tr.3 86:18-87:21, 159:25-163:13. 
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the change in their everyday domestic situation. He cites the testimony of 
his expert, Dr. Bursztajn, that as long as the children are doing well 
where they are, moving them would constitute an unjustified "social ex-
periment."167 However, the trial court rejected this standard as being con-
trary to the responsibility of the court to act in the best interests of the 
children. 168 Case law similarly rejects placing determinative weight on 
continuing the current custody arrangement. As noted by the supreme 
court, in deciding custody, the court should consider "the identity of the 
primary caretaker during the marriage," as well as "identity of the parent 
with whom the child has spent most of his or her time pending custody 
determination if that period has been lengthy."169 In cases such as this 
where those are two different people, Dr. Bursztajn's standard would con-
travene the Utah Supreme Court's direction that a district court should 
give the former factor prominent place in its decision calculus. 170 Moreo-
ver, the supreme court warned against giving determinative weight to a 
custody arrangement based not on evidence and findings , but only on a 
temporary orders hearing: 
A temporary custody order is only that, temporary. It is effective 
only until a fully informed custody determination can be made at a 
final hearing. Temporary custody is not to be treated as permanent 
custody. Permanent custody is modifiable only upon a threshold 
167. Br. Father 43. 
168. Ruling 35:11-23. 
169. Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1996). 
170. Id. 
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showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances. If a 
temporary order of custody were to be given permanent status sub-
ject to Hogge's changed-circumstances test, no party would ever 
stipulate to a temporary arrangement and every hearing on tempo-
rary custody would involve the time-consuming presentation of 
witnesses, both expert and lay, as well as other types of evidence. 
In short, a temporary custody hearing would become a permanent 
custody hearing.171 
In conclusion, IYiother does not deny that Father has, in the words 
of the trial court, "made some major changes in his life ... from where he 
was three, four, five years ago."172 The question at trial was whether those 
changes would stick after the harsh light of the court proceedings was not 
on Father any longer. As Dr. Malovich put it: 
If the changes are because Mr. Fullmer is becoming a healthier in-
dividual, if it's because he has gained insight, if it's because he has 
taken more responsibility for his life and the children and he's ... 
functioning better and is able to better meet their needs and be a 
more consistent parent figure to them, and is getting healthier in 
resolving his issues toward Ms. Fullmer, then that's very positive 
and that's very commendable and means something very positive. 
If the changes that have been made are a reflection of he and his 
family's motivation to prevail in the current custody litigation, it's 
not that positive .... I think it's very difficult to make at this point 
which is my hesitation, which is why I'm trying to explain why I'm 
not saying, oh, that fixes everything .... It may be fixed; it may be 
that there's been a really positive change in his whole lifestyle and 
approach to life has changed. It's also possible that he's responded 
to what amounts to some pretty detailed coaching on how to look 
171. Tucker, 910 P.2d at 1215-16. 
172. Ruling 21:2-10. 
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better for a custody evaluator and how to prevail in Court and I 
don't know to what degree each of those factors may be at play. 173 
Given this dilemma, the trial court was well within its discretion to 
choose to give primary custody to the parent who had been the children's 
primary caretaker for the entirety of the children's lives before the tempo-
rary order was entered. 
Ill. MOTHER SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY FEES FOR THE NECESSITY 
OF DEFENDING AGAINST THIS APPEAL. 
Finally, Mother asks for her attorney fees for the necessity of filing 
this brief under Rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 
24(k) requires a brief to be "concise, presented with accuracy, logically ar-
ranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, im-
material or scandalous matters." If a party submits a brief that is not in 
compliance with this requirement, the Court may impose sanctions on the 
offending party, including an award of attorney fees. 174 Bacause failing to 
adhere to the briefing requirements "increases the costs of litigation for 
both parties and unduly burdens the judiciary's time and energy,"175 an 
award of attorney fees is justified to help compensate the innocent party. 
This Court has also noted that while sanctions for frivolous appeals 
173. Tr.3 161:6-162:12. 
174. Utah R. App. P. 24(k). 
175. In re Estate of Pahl, 2007 UT App 389, ~ 17, 174 P.3d 642. 
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"should only be applied in egregious cases," the court has a lower thresh-
old for awarding sanctions based on Rule 24(k). 176 
Earlier in this brief, Mother has already explained that an assign-
ment of error for failure to recuse is not reviewable without first filing a 
motion and affidavit under Rule 63(b). She has pointed out Father's fail-
ure to marshal the evidence. She has noted the lack of organization and 
systematic analysis in the argument section of Father's brief. In other 
submissions to the Court, Mother has also pointed out the sloppy and de-
ficient nature of Father's docketing statement, 177 conveyed her concern 
that Father had filed this appeal for the primary purpose of extracting 
concessions from her after final judgment, 178 and noted that Father sub-
stantially delayed the filing of his brief, flouting the Court's warnings and 
directions with respect to timeliness. 179 Finally, Mother notes the utter 
lack of merit to Father's grounds for appeal-this is simply an appeal that 
should not have been brought. 
Some, or perhaps even all of these factors could be excused if Father 
were acting pro se or on the advice of an attorney inexperienced in the 
rules and practices of this Court. However, Father has no such excuse-
based on a quick search through the case law, it appears that Father's 
176. Id. at ii 16. 
177. Response to Appellant's Motion To Refer at 2- 4 (filed Feb. 11, 2013). 
178. Id . at 4---5. 
179. Motion To Strike Lodged Brief at 5 (filed Jan. 7, 2014). 
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appellate counsel has appeared before this Court over 40 times, and be-
fore the Utah Supreme Court more than ten times. All of these factors to-
gether merit a sanction of attorney fees from this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mother respectfully requests this court to 
affirm the trial court's decision in this matter and to award Mother her 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal. 
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